We present an extensive breakdown of the auction design space that captures the essential similarities and di erences of many auction mechanisms in a format more descriptive and useful than simple taxonomies. This parametrization serves as an organizational framework in which to classify work within the eld, and uncovers parameter combinations corresponding to novel mechanisms. The structured characterization of auction rules can be exploited for the modular design of con gurable auction servers. It also facilitates the communication of auction rules to software agents, enabling the automation of exible market-based negotiation.
Introduction
The manifest popularity of Internet auctions 1 suggests that automated auctions will play a signi cant role in electronic commerce. Indeed, this might 1 be the case by de nition, as any well-de ned set of rules for determining the terms of an exchange of something for money can reasonably be characterized as an auction 22] . Since the automation of negotiation processes invariably requires their precise speci cation (in programs at least), the task of designing negotiation rules is essentially that of designing auctions. Thus, auction design constitutes a central activity for any situation where agents|humans or software proxies|negotiate the exchange of resources. We have argued elsewhere 42] that such situations will be commonplace for arti cial agents, just as they are for humans engaged in electronic commerce.
The literature on auctions identi es a wide variety of auction types, which we discuss below. Despite the large number of online auctions, 2 the vast majority implement a variant of the English open-outcry auction, the type most familiar to the general public 37, 43] . Nevertheless, the rules and interfaces are not standardized, and so users must learn the conventions operating at a particular site. Those wishing to implement automated bidding agents must likewise customize their agents' behaviors to the individual sites. This makes it particularly di cult to coordinate bidding behavior across several sites, as when identical items or close substitutes are auctioned simultaneously at multiple auction sites. 3 To facilitate the development of agents able to participate in multiple auctions, we could standardize auction rules, or provide a standard way to describe auction rules. The latter approach is of course far more exible, and is what we advocate. Auctions would publish their rules in standard descriptive terms, interpretable by humans or software agents. Based on these descriptions, agents synthesize operational bidding strategies serving their objectives.
We have pursued this approach in the design of our con gurable auction $8.7 billion in 1998 10]. In fact, there were an estimated 1,000 electronic \exchanges" online in early 1999, and that number is expected to grow to 10,000 within a year 7].
server: the Michigan Internet AuctionBot 47]. 4 The AuctionBot implements a wide variety of auction mechanisms, as speci ed via the settings of a collection of orthogonal parameters. There is a natural correspondence between the decomposition of auctions into functional elements and an object-oriented approach to implementation. We have successfully exploited this similarity in our development of the AuctionBot|the majority of auction rules are encoded in a manner that allows them to be shared among the basic auctioneer programs.
In addition to its practical role in auction implementation and rule description, we believe that the parametrization is also useful in its own right as a characterization of the auction design space. Although the characterization as presented here is far from complete, we believe it a helpful start in organizing research on automated negotiation mechanisms.
The parametrization reported in this paper extends that currently implemented in the AuctionBot in two signi cant ways: we de ne the parameters for both linear and nonlinear pricing, and we do so in the context of multidimensional auctions|auctions that mediate the allocation of more than one resource type. Examples of these auctions include the FCC's Simultaneous Ascending Auction 23, 25] , in which the eligibility rules create a loose coupling between resources, as well as expressly combinatorial auctions, which we discuss in more detail in Section 4.4.
We present the parametrization in several stages. Section 2 provides general de nitions of the features common to all auctions, including a precise speci cation of bid semantics. In Section 3 we present the auction parameters, and the values they can take. In Section 4 we discuss in more detail one particularly important parameter category: the policy by which an auction forms exchanges between agents. In Section 5 we classify some of the well-known auction types using our description language.
Common Auction Characteristics
Many di erent types of auctions are in common use. The English openoutcry auction is often used to sell art and other collectibles, for example. The Dutch auction is commonly used to sell perishables, such as sh or owers. First-price sealed bid (FPSB) and second-price sealed bid (SPSB, or Vickrey) auctions are most often used in procurement situations. Call markets and continuous double auctions (CDAs) are favored institutions for trading securities and nancial instruments. These institutions and others are discussed in various auction survey papers 12, 13, 22, 26, 27] . Some authors organize the space of auction designs in a hierarchical taxonomy 12, 13] . For example, Figure 1 classi es the classic auctions mentioned in the preceding paragraph by whether they are single or double sided, and then by whether they are sealed-bid or open-outcry. The ascending/descending distinction di erentiates the English and Dutch outcry auctions.
Explicit tree representations, however, introduce an arti cial ordering on design decisions. In addition, any given tree obscures common features on di erent branches. Rather than use a hierarchical taxonomy, we focus on the features that de ne the commonalities and di erences among various auctions.
Three Core Activities
The rst step in organizing the design space is to recognize three core activities common to auctions. All auctions must perform the rst two activities, and most perform the third as well. In the course of an auction, activities of these types may be interleaved and iterated any number of times, depending upon the auction rules.
Receive bids: Bids are the messages sent by agents to indicate their willingness to participate in exchanges. On receiving a bid, the auction veri es that it satis es the auction rules, and if so, admits it into the active set of bids.
Clear: The central purpose of an auction is to clear the market, determining resource exchanges and corresponding payments between buyers and sellers.
Reveal intermediate information: Auctions commonly supply agents
with some form of intermediate status information, typically in the form of hypothetical results were the auction to clear at that moment. We refer to these status reports generically as quotes.
This perspective leads naturally to a description of auction features along three axes: bidding rules, clearing policy, and information revelation (quote) policy. Section 3 elaborates on these three axes.
The Semantics of Bids
The canonical bid in an English open-outcry auction represents an o er by the bidder to purchase a unit item at the stated price. Presumably, the bidder will be happier to get the item at an even lower price. Above the stated price, the bidder has not expressed a willingness to buy anything.
To generalize the concepts to multidimensional mechanisms, we consider an auction that allocates the set of resources J . Let z denote a vector of resource quantities, one for each j 2 J . Let z i be agent i's net allocation vector, with elements z i;j for each j 2 J . Element z i;j is the quantity of resource j that agent i is buying/selling in the auction|when z i;j is positive the agent is buying j, and when z i;j is negative, the agent is selling j. The domain of net allocation vectors (assumed the same for every agent) is Z j <. When Z j is the set of integers, we describe the resource as discrete. When Z j is an interval of <, we refer to the resource as continuous. Allocation vectors may mix discrete and continuous resources. The domain of z is the cross product of the individual resource domains, Z = Q j2J Z j . 5 Let p j be the price of j expressed in monetary units, and p the vector of all prices. The net payment by agent i, i , is simply the product of the prices and the quantities in i's net allocation, i = p z i :
(1) Notice that, whereas prices are nonnegative, net payments can be positive or negative. A negative payment indicates that money is owing to the agent.
Nonlinear pricing relaxes (1) . A complete speci cation of nonlinear prices associates a payment, z , for every allocation vector, z, de ning a payment lattice, . We require that payments be nondecreasing in z, and the payment associated with the null allocation be zero.
A bid is a message that states an agent's willingness to exchange money| expressed in terms of prices or net payments|for one or more net allocations. The content of the bid (i.e., the o er) is a correspondence between net allocations and either prices or payments. When agent i's o er is expressed in prices, we denote it by w i . When it is in terms of payments, we denote it by i . Note that the former is a special case of the latter|a vector of quantities speci es a net allocation and the product of quantities and prices determines a payment.
The bid is a re ection of the agent's demand for the resource. In the particular case of competitive analysis, an agent's Walrasian demand correspondence assigns the set of utility-maximizing allocations to every price vector p 20, page 23]. In tatonnement-like protocols, such as the walras algorithm 5, 40], a competitive agent's bid in a (one dimensional) auction is its demand correspondence assuming the prices of the remaining resources are xed.
Bids in Price Space
Let w i be i's bid, expressed as a correspondence between prices and quantities. The term w i (p) represents the set of net allocations that i expresses a willingness to accept at price vector p. Its inverse, w ?1 i (z), denotes the set of price vectors for which i would accept the net allocation z.
In order to de ne bid relationships, we require some notation for comparison between sets. Let be a set with a partial preorder, , and let 0 and 00 be subsets of . We say that 0 00 i : (i) for all ! 0 2 0 , there is an element, ! 00 2 00 such that ! 0 ! 00 , and (ii) for all ! 00 2 00 , there is an The next example considers monotone discrete o ers in two dimensions.
Example 1 Consider a mechanism for two resources, with price vector denoted (p A ; p B ) and net allocations denoted hz i;A ; z i;B i. Suppose that an agent's o er states that w i ((1; 2)) = fh4; 3i; h5; 2ig.
Values of the correspondence at the price vector (2; 2) that are consistent with monotonicity include w i ((2; 2)) = fh4; 2ig or w i ((2; 2)) = fh3; 3i; h5; 1ig.
A bid is divisible if whenever some allocation is acceptable at a price, all fractions of that allocation are also acceptable. To express this formally, let (z) be the set of vectors in Z between the zero vector and z. That is, If a bid is monotone and divisible, then the o er correspondence can be speci ed conveniently in terms of its boundary, rather than enumerating the entire set of acceptable net allocations for each price.
Bids in Payment Space
We now turn our attention to bids expressed as a correspondence between payments and net allocation vectors, focusing on the monotonicity property. A bid is monotone in payments if its o er correspondence requires greater allocations as prices increase. In other words, if z is acceptable at some payment, then the agent is willing to take z at a lesser payment, or a greater net allocation at the same payment. Figure 4 illustrates iso-payment curves (i.e., curves that connect vectors of equal valuations) on a two-dimensional lattice. The curve labeled + represents a positive payment by the agent. Net allocations below this curve, such as (0; 1), indicate that the agent is not willing to pay + to for that change in its allocation. Net allocations above this curve are acceptable to the agent for the payment + . The curve labeled = 0 represents a net payment of zero, and must intersect the zero allocation vector. Figure 5 illustrates iso-payment curves on a two-dimensional lattice for a nonmonotone o er. The agent is willing to exchange (1; ?1) for a payment + , but is not o ering to take (1; 0) at the same payment. Note that monotonicity in prices does not imply monotonicity in payments, nor vice versa. A simple example with discrete o ers illustrates the point.
Example 2 Consider a one-dimensional o er for a discrete good.
Suppose i o ers to buy (up to) z i;j at a price p j , and (up to)ẑ i;j atp j , wherep j < p j . The payments associated with z i;j andẑ i;j are z i;j = p j z i;j and^ z i;j =p jẑi;j , respectively. Monotonicity in prices requires z i;j ẑ i;j , but it does not impose monotonicity in 
The Auction Parameter Space
In this section, we present a parametrization of the auction design space that is broad enough to encompass most of the classic auctions, common commercial and online auctions, and many others. We have attempted to de ne the parameters in such a way as to make them orthogonal. Onedimensional versions of most of these parameters have been implemented in the AuctionBot system, providing users great exibility in choosing the rules of the auctions they create. We are currently in the process of extending the AuctionBot to support various forms of multidimensional auctions.
Earlier, sparser versions of this parametrization appear in previous reports 28, 47] . Other researchers have also attempted to organize the space of auction designs. Engelbrecht-Wiggans 12] parametrizes a smaller set of auctions as part of a broad classi cation of auction research. Friedman 13] presents a taxonomic structure of the design space with particular emphasis on variations of the CDA. The FM96.5 (FishMarket) testbed 32] is based on a detailed parametrization of the space of Dutch auctions.
Our presentation is organized along the three axes introduced in Section 2.1: bidding rules, clearing policy, and information revelation policy.
Bidding Rules
Bidding rules determine under what conditions bids may be introduced, modi ed, or withdrawn, as a function of agent identity, current bid status, or even the entire auction history. If an incoming bid satis es these rules, then the auction admits it into the set of current bids. If a bid fails to satisfy the admission criteria, the auction noti es the agent that the bid was rejected.
Because bids can express arbitrary correspondences, we can assume (without loss of generality) that each agent has at most one active bid in an auction at any time. An agent changes its bid by submitting a new one, if allowed by the auction rules.
Expressiveness
An auction mechanism dictates a language for bids, de ning their syntax as well as expressive power. In this discussion we are concerned with semantics, and thus limit attention to expressive power. The bid language dictates whether o ers are in terms of prices or payments, and the class of correspondences that may be expressed.
For example, classes of correspondences supported by bid languages in the Michigan Internet AuctionBot include the following:
Price-quantity schedules. A bid schedule is a stepwise speci cation of o ers to buy or sell various quantities at discrete price points. The price-quantity expression has two subclasses, corresponding to restrictive special cases: Combinatorial. When the auction is multidimensional and mediates the allocation of discrete goods, agents make o ers on bundles of resources. O ers are correspondences between bundles and payments. General properties of correspondences, such as those mentioned in Section 2.2, can be used to further restrict bid expressions. For example, an auction might require that bids be monotone or divisible. When they are divisible (whether required or not), then a price-quantity schedule or continuous o er function would typically be interpreted as a boundary on the set of acceptable allocations in the o er correspondence.
Restrictions on bid expressions may re ect domain constraints, or auction policies adopted for reasons of computation, communication, or incentive engineering. For example, single price points may be considered easier to specify than complete schedules. As another example, requiring that o ers be divisible may simplify clearing calculations (discussed in Section 4). In the combinatorial context, Rothkopf et al. 33 ] present several cases where restricting the expressive power of bids allows polynomial-time computation of optimal allocations in multidimensional auctions for discrete resources.
Buyers and Sellers
Typically, we classify auctions by whether they have one buyer or many buyers, and one seller or many sellers. The three combinations of interest are fone buyer:many sellersg, fmany buyers:one sellerg, and fmany buyers:many sellersg. A restriction to \one" essentially means that the auction is onesided, and the sole buyer or seller must be designated.
For example, a one-dimensional auction with a single buyer, designated h, imposes the restrictions 8i 6 = h; 8p j ; z 2 w i (p j ) z 0; 8p j ; z 2 w h (p j ) z 0:
Similarly, if h is the designated sole seller, 8i 6 = h; 8p j ; z 2 w i (p j ) z 0; 8p j ; z 2 w h (p j ) z 0:
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The restrictions can be extended in a straightforward manner to bids expressed in payments. Note that in the fmany buyers:many sellersg case, agents' bids can express o ers to either buy or sell, or both.
In the multidimensional case, each agent's bid may be permitted to express willingness to buy or sell, or both, for each resource type. An even more general formulation of this rule allows the auction to restrict each agent's bids to certain ranges of the o er correspondence space.
Dominance
Bid dominance rules restrict the relationship of an agent's new o er to the bid, if any, it replaces. Both increasing and decreasing forms of dominance may apply, and, when bids are monotone, an auction can impose di erent restrictions on the buy and sell sides of the bid.
Let w i andŵ i be two bids.
De nition 4ŵ i is superior to w i in the range p; p] i , for all p 2 p; p],
De nition 5ŵ i is inferior to w i in the range p; p] i w i is superior toŵ i . Figure 6 illustrates a bid and three alternative bids. Bid w 0 is superior to w over all prices, w 00 is inferior over all prices, andw is inferior in the prices that correspond to negative quantities, and superior in positive quantities.
The ascending rule requires that new bids be superior to old bids, while the descending rule requires new bids be inferior. Intuitively, the combination that requires that the buy-side of a bid increases and the sell-side of the bid decreases is the most natural, since it represents a strengthening of the o er on both sides. However, the rule that requires a seller to increase its sell bid has found use as part of a protocol for decentralized task allocation 39]. It is an example of how an expanded view of the auction design space can lead to new, potentially interesting protocols.
Note that the increasing restriction, when applied to the sell side, allows an agent to e ectively withdraw its bids by o ering to sell at in nity. Similarly, when the decreasing rule is applied to the buy side, the agent can e ectively withdraw by o ering to buy at a price of zero.
For bids expressed in payment space,^ is superior to if it expresses maximal payments at least as great on all net allocation vectors. For monotone bids, this is the case i , for all ,^ i ( ) i ( ). That is, the set of net allocations acceptable at the payment expressed by^ must be a superset of those expressed by .
It is useful to compare the e ects of increasing a bid in price space on the representation of that bid in payment space. Consider two points on a price-quantity schedule: (z A new bidŵ, that is superior (in prices) to w, increases the price at which the agent is willing to exchange the respective quantities. Projected into payment space,^ z 1 < z 1 (because z 1 is negative), and^ z 2 > z 2 . Thus, the ascending price rule causes the bid to increase on the buy side and decrease on the sell side in payment space.
It turns out that the direction of in uence of the ascending rule in payments is the same as the mixed rule in prices. Figure 7 illustrates the four o ers in Figure 6 mapped into payment space.~ , which had mixed dominance in prices, is superior to in payments.
Beat-the-Quote
The dominance rules of the previous section require that new bids bear some relation to previous bids by the same bidder. Many auctions require that a new bid satisfy some condition de ned in terms of bids by other bidders. For example, in an English outcry auction, a new bid must beat the highest so far (perhaps by a speci ed increment). We capture this concept by de ning analogous dominance rules with respect to price quotes, summary information about the bid state revealed by the auction (discussed in detail in Section 3.3.1). Typically, the purpose of such rules is to ensure a progression of prices, thus directing the process to a steady state, if not an actual equilibrium.
Typically, the auction's quote provides evidence regarding potential outcomes of the auction, in the form of the agent's tentative allocation. Let i (q; w) denote the allocation that price quote q entails agent i would receive had it sent the bid w to the auction. dimensional beat-the-quote rule requires that: if i (q; w i ) > 0; i (q;ŵ i ) i (q; w i ); else if i (q; w i ) < 0; i (q;ŵ i ) i (q; w i ):
In words, an agent's new bid must keep the same sign of, and must not decrease the magnitude of, its tentative allocation. The rule for payment space is the same, with substituted for w. Note that it would not have been su cient to de ne this rule in terms of simple price/payment increases (or decreases), since bids in general refer to various quantities at various prices/payments.
Example 3 Consider a one-dimensional auction for discrete resources in which an agent has submitted an indivisible bid. Suppose the agent has a current o er to sell two units if the price is between $5 and $10, or sell four units if the price is $10 or greater. A price quote of $8 implies that the agent is winning two units. A new o er to sell two units if the price is between $5 and $7, or four units if the price is $7 or greater, would increase the agent's tentative winnings to four units, and thus satis es the beat-the-quote rule. However, a new o er to sell two units if the price is between $3 and $10, and four units if the price is $10 or greater, would not satisfy the beat-the-quote rule.
Notice that the bid dominance and beat-the-quote rules are complementary. Both potential new bids in Example 3 dominate the original bid, but only the rst beats the quote. The next example demonstrates that a new bid can beat the quote without dominating the previous bid.
Example 4 Consider an agent with a divisible o er to buy two units at $2, or one at $10. Suppose the price quote is $6. A new bid, in which the two-unit o er is at $5 and the one-unit o er at $7, would beat the quote, but would not satisfy dominance because the o er decreased from one to zero units in the range $7, $10].
We can generalize this to the multidimensional case by requiring that it hold with respect to each resource. This requirement may be too strong, however, as evidenced by the following example. (0; 1) . It is quite possible that the agent would prefer to raise its bid on (1; 0) next. However, the version of the beat-the-quote rule described above would not permit this switch because the quantity of the second resource decreases. An alternative multidimensional generalization would require only that the beat-the-quote condition hold with respect to some resource. This may seem rather weak, but in conjunction with a dominance rule, is often exactly what is desired. For example, several of the combinatorial auctions mentioned in Section 4.4 essentially apply this combination of bid restrictions.
The most common variant of the beat-the-quote rule requires that the new bid increase the price by some increment above (or below) the quoted prices. For example, in the English auction, when the agent is not winning the good, its new o er must not only make it the winning bidder, but it must do so at a price at least above the current winning bidder. We extend this concept to the more general case in the following manner. New bidŵ i beats the quote by i there exists some w 0 such that:
1. w 0 satis es the beat-the-quote rule (without ), 2.ŵ i is superior to w 0 , and 3. for some z 0,ŵ ?1 i (z) w 0 ?1 (z) + , or for some z 0,ŵ ?1 i (z) w 0 ?1 (z) ? .
Such a rule could similarly be formulated in a payment-space version. The beat-the-quote-by-rule is used to speed the progression of prices. There is a risk that the rule will result in a loss of e ciency when an agent values the object more than the winner, but not by enough to continue bidding. However, in many protocols|such as the multi-item auction of Demange et al. 8 ]|the e ciency loss is bounded, typically by an amount linear in .
Withdrawal and Expiration Rules
Auction rules dictate whether bid withdrawals are allowed, and if so when. For example, one possible rule is that withdrawals are permitted only in conjunction with a clearing operation. An expiration is a planned withdrawal, typically speci ed at bid time, also subject to permissibility by the auction rules.
Activity Rules
In many complex domains, agents can bene t from a strategy in which they withhold information while others reveal information. For example, the top two performing agents in the 1990-91 Santa Fe Institute double auction tournament employed a strategy of waiting in the background while others bid. When the market seemed about to converge, the agents would step in and \steal the deal" 34]. Clearly, if everyone employed this strategy, the market would fail. Activity rules are designed to counteract such behavior.
DeMartini et al. 9] present a formal de nition of one feasible activity rule. 6 In each round, an agent is eligible to place bids on as many items as it had (provisionally) winning bids, plus the number of bids it placed in the previous round. For example, if the agent was provisionally winning items A and B last round, and it chose to enhance its bid with o ers on items C and D, then it is eligible to bid on up to four items.
Systematic parametrization of the space of activity rules would be quite useful, and is a topic for future work.
Clearing Policy
As noted in Section 2.1, an auction clears when it commands an allocation based on the bids it has received. We formalize the auction's clearing policy in terms of a matching function, , which maps the set of current bids to net allocations and payments for the agents involved. By calling it a matching function, we underscore that the array of net allocations corresponds to an exchange of resources (and money) among the agents. This section details the parameters that dictate how and when this exchange is determined.
Agent O er
Agent 1 sell 1 unit at $1 Agent 2 buy 1 unit at $2 Agent 3 sell 1 unit at $3 Agent 4 buy 1 unit at $4 Table 1: An example with four bids.
Matching function
We can view the matching function as determining the exchanges in two steps: rst determining which agents will trade, and second, the exact terms of each exchange. De ne the surplus of an exchange to be the di erence in maximal (resp. minimal) payments the agents are willing to pay (receive) for the given net allocation, as expressed by their bids. . If its surplus is positive, the exchange is considered mutually bene cial. We apply the term clear to the operation of determining allocations because in general, after the exchanges are executed, no mutually bene cial trades exist among the o ers represented by remaining bids. An allocation is locally e cient if it maximizes the total surplus as represented by the bids.
Example 6 Consider two candidate allocations for the singleunit bids listed in Table 1 . In the rst, agents 1 and 4 trade. This trade allocates the goods to the agents with the highest stated values|agent 4 buys one and agent 3 keeps one. In the second potential allocation, agent 4 trades with agent 3, and agent 2 trades with agent 1. The agents who end up with the goods have the rst and third highest valuations. This allocation is ine cient because agents 2 and 3 could both be made better o by a further trade between them. Although both sets of exchanges clear the market (i.e., there are no trades available among the remaining bids), only the former is locally e cient.
In general, there may be many allocations that satisfy local e ciency but di er in their allocation of money.
the locally e cient solution for Example 6, namely, that agent 1 sells a unit to agent 4, would be mutually bene cial if agent 4 paid agent 1 any price between $1 and $4 for the object. At the lower end of the range, agent 4 captures all $3 of the surplus. At the higher end of the acceptable price range, agent 1 captures the surplus.
The selection of matching functions depends on the nature of the resource, the dimensionality of the auction, the expected format of the agents' utility functions, and the designer's goals. A variety of matching functions are discussed in Section 4.
Clear Timing
An important aspect of clearing policy is that determining when clears should occur. Some common forms of timing policy include:
Scheduled. Clears occur at a speci ed set of nominal times. The specication may take the form of an explicit enumeration, or some implicit description, for example, the frequency of a periodic clear. Random. Clears are determined according to some random distribution.
Memoryless distributions, such as the Poisson, are attractive candidates because they deter agents from applying complex time-dependent strategies. The relevant parameters of the distribution are typically made public, so the agents participate with some expectation of the timing of events. Bidder activity. Clears occur whenever a new bid is admitted. This is the timing policy of continual auctions such as the CDA. A variation of this rule allows for synchronized auctions|rather than clearing when a bid is admitted, the auction can clear when a new bid has been received from each participant, or when a xed number of bids has been received. Bidder inactivity. The auction clears when no bid has been admitted for a speci ed period. Auctions can also combine these schedules in various ways. For example, the online version of the English auction clears at a time determined by the latest of a xed time and a period of inactivity. 
Closing Conditions
The closing conditions are logical tests that determine whether a clear should be the nal clear. Auctions can close at a scheduled time, at a random time, after a period of inactivity, or when the bids of designated agents (e.g., the seller, in a single-seller auction) are matched. In some cases, we desire that auctions close when an external signal is received (e.g., indicating that some more global quiescence property has been achieved 41]).
Tie Breaking
A tie occurs whenever two agents express a willingness to take the same net allocation at the same price (or payment). The manner in which ties are resolved can also in uence the outcome of an auction. Three common methods are to break ties arbitrarily, in favor of the earlier bids, or in favor of bids for larger quantities.
Auctioneer Fees
The policies discussed thus far determine payments between the buyer and seller. In commercial auctions, it is common for the auctioneer to collect some fees, and these payments must be considered by the agents. A payment may be required of the buyer, seller or both. 
Information Revelation Policy
We formalize the auction's information revelation policy in terms of a quote function, , which maps the set of current bids to a message we call the price quote, which represents some summary of the current bid state. 8 The parameters discussed below control the timing and content of price quotes.
Price Quotes
The feature common to price quotes in many classic auctions is their information content. A price quote informs an agent of the range of o ers that would have been in the exchange set had the auction cleared at the time the quote was issued. This de nition is given in past hypothetical tense because a price quote is necessarily relative to the bidding state at quote time|if the time necessary to transmit the price quote message varies between agents, the price quote may be stale before it is received.
In many cases, the quote function can be viewed as an impotent version of the matching function |it calculates hypothetical exchanges and then announces the prices (or payments) without actually clearing. For example, the English auction uses the rst-price rule to both generate price quotes and determine the exchange when the auction clears. We say the quote is separating if all agents can correctly infer their tentative allocations. Using the notation employed in Section 3.1.4, a separating quote provides perfect information i (q; w) about the allocation i gets with current bid w.
However, it is not necessary to use as a basis for . Rassenti et al. 30] and DeMartini et al. 9] both present combinatorial auctions that use relaxed linear programming techniques for , and integer programming for . In both cases, the information provided by the quote q is not always enough for an agent to correctly infer its allocation. If q is noisy, then i (q; w) may correspond to a distribution over potential allocations.
When the same quote is reported to every agent, it is anonymous. When quotes are customized for each agent, we say they are discriminatory, and denote them q i .
In one-dimensional auctions with continuous, strictly monotone bids, the price quote, necessarily, must be the single clearing price, p , that balances aggregate supply and demand. In one dimensional auctions for discrete re-sources with divisible bids, there is typically a range of clearing prices, speci ed by the endpoints p and p. The bid quote, p, is the price an agent would have to bid under in order to place a winning sell bid. The ask quote, p, is the price an agent would have to bid over to place a winning buy bid.
In the CDA, standing buy and sell o ers never overlap, hence the bid and ask prices re ect the spread between the highest buyer and the lowest seller In fact, Vickrey's seminal article 38] is an examination of the special case where M = 1: p corresponds to the rst price, and p to the second price.
Example 7 Consider one agent with an o er to buy one unit at $10, and another with an o er to sell one unit at $5. The buy and sell o ers overlap, so if the auction cleared at this moment, it would form a exchange. A bid-ask quote, in this case, would report that a new buyer would need to outbid $10 (displacing the current buyer), and a seller underbid $5 (displacing the current seller), in order to be part of the tentative allocation.
Under some conditions, if an agent's bid is equal to the bid or ask quote, it cannot tell whether it is in the exchange set. Thus, it is sometimes useful to augment the bid-ask spread with information directly telling the agent its tentative allocation given the current bids.
When multi-unit indivisible bids are allowed, separating prices may not exist. That is, there may not be a single per-unit price above which an agent's buy o er is accepted and below which it is rejected. For example, two of the bids shown in Table 2 Table 2 : An example with indivisible bids without an e cient clearing price. than $2. Moreover, the socially e cient solution is to sell all three units to agent 4. Attempting to determine an exchange set based on a single price fails to exploit all pro table trades.
In order to present the agents with the information necessary to determine their hypothetical allocations, the auction needs to discriminate based on quantity. Nonlinear pricing allows an auctioneer faced with the example in Table 2 to quote, for example, $3:5 for three units, $4:5 for two units, and $5:5 for one unit. These prices support the e cient allocation and clearly indicate to the agents whether they are in the tentative exchange set.
Elsewhere 46], we have shown that a lattice of separating payments always exists in one-sided combinatorial auctions. The method of constructing these payments is the basis of the A1BA mechanism 44, Chapter 5], discussed brie y in Section 4.4.
Before leaving the topic of price quotes, we should mention price clocks, which are used in variations of the Dutch auction. A speci cation of a price clock must include start and end prices, and a (usually linear) price adjustment schedule. Clocks can be used to generate the bid quote, the ask quote, or both. Although the implementation of online Dutch auctions has been investigated 31], considerable infrastructure is required to ensure that all agents have equal access to the auction over the distributed and asynchronous network. We argue elsewhere 43] that little is gained by attempting to reconstitute real-time auctions online; our e ort is better spent developing auctions that take advantage of the asynchrony and exibility of the online environment.
Quote Timing
Like clear events, price quotes can vary in number and frequency. Some of the most signi cant choices are: No price quotes. Auctions that reveal no information are traditionally called sealed-bid auctions. Scheduled. Quotes are generated according to a speci ed nominal schedule. Random. Price quotes are generated according to some stochastic process. Bidder activity. Price quotes are generated with each new bid admitted. Bidder inactivity. Price quotes are generated when no bid has been admitted for a speci ed period.
An auction may generate many price quotes as it proceeds, depending upon the quote schedule and the clearing and closing policies of the auction.
Order Book
The term order book is commonly used in organized exchanges, like the NYSE, to refer to the current set of active bids. The auctioneer may make some or all of the information in the order book public. The most common choices are to keep the book closed, reveal only the current winning bids, or to open the book completely. Online auctions, such as eBay and Onsale, commonly identify current winners.
Transaction History
Auctions may publicize selected information about past exchanges. Such information may include the prices, quantities, or even the identities of the transacting agents. If an auction has several clears but does not reveal historical prices, then agents get from the auction price information only for exchanges in which they participated. Revealing past transaction prices publicly avoids such an information asymmetry.
Matching Functions
In this section we isolate the matching functions used in a variety of online and experimental auctions.
Uniform-Price One-Dimensional Matching Functions
A clearing policy is uniform price if every exchange in a given clear occurs at the same price. Recall that a quote is separating if an agent can correctly infer its tentative allocation. When bids are discrete, monotone, and divisible, a separating uniform price is guaranteed to exist. In fact, there is typically a range of such prices. The set of bids in the exchange set can be identi ed in the following manner. First, for conceptual simplicity, let us treat a multi-unit o er as a collection of component single-unit o ers (actually splitting them up in an implementation is necessary only in the worst case 45]). Let m denote the number of unit sell o ers at or below p, and n the number of unit buy o ers at or above p. Let l = min(m; n). The set of winning buy o ers, B in , comprises the l highest unit buy o ers. The set of winning sell o ers, S in , comprises the l lowest unit sell o ers. We justify restricting attention to this method of generating the transaction set based on the local e ciency argument. A uniform-price auction applying these rules can use any tie-breaking rule and any algorithm for pairing the winning buy and sell bids.
Having selecting the winning bids, we now turn our attention to setting the transaction price. The matching function k , used in the k-double auction 35, 36] , sets the transaction price according to p = kp + (1 ? k)p, k 2 0; 1]. k covers the full range of transaction prices that are uniform, separating, and support locally e cient allocations.
Notice that the two extreme values of k produce the (M + 1)st and Mth prices, respectively. Although no uniform-price sealed bid auction is BayesNash incentive compatible for multi-unit buyers or sellers 45], the (M + 1)stprice, sealed-bid auction is incentive compatible for single-unit buyers, and the Mth-price, sealed-bid auction is incentive compatible for single-unit sellers.
The Dual-Price mechanism 21] uses the k-auction pricing but excludes the lowest-priced o er in B in , and the highest-priced o er in S in . The Dual Price mechanism maintains individual rationality, incentive compatibility, and budget balance, but sacri ces local e ciency by eschewing the lowestsurplus trade.
Another uniform-price auction that sacri ces local e ciency in pursuit of other desirable properties is the UPDA 24]. The \1S" version of the UPDA announces, as its ask quote, the second highest o er in the union of all the non-winning buy bids and the lowest o er in B in . The bid quote is computed in an analogous manner using the sell bids. A new bid must beat the quote in order to be included in the tentative match set. We designate this matching function
1S
. The admission rule results in a book in which the tentative match set may not correspond to the highest buy and lowest sell bids. Instead, membership in B in and S in is dependent on the order bids are received, and the procedure described in this section cannot be used to implement the 1S version of the UPDA.
Discriminatory-Price One-Dimensional Matching Functions
When we relax the constraint that prices be uniform, a wider range of pricing options becomes available. Table 3 provides an example with which we can compare the matching functions in this section. Here t 1 < t 2 < t 3 < t 4 < t 5 < t c , where t c is the time the clear occurs. Local e ciency demands that agents 1 and 4 be the winning sellers, and agents 2 and 5 be the winning buyers. We can determine B in and S in in the manner discussed in the previous section. There are two possible exchange sets that can be formed from this combination of buyers and sellers. Under uniform pricing, all transactions occur at the same price. Thus, agents are indi erent between the two possible exchange combinations. However, as the following discussion shows, when prices are discriminatory, it matters a great deal how agents in the transaction sets are matched.
Pay Buyer's/Seller's Bid
There are several ways in which we might consider generalizing the rst-and second-price rules. One uses the uniform Mth-and (M + 1)st-price rules discussed above. An alternative generalization is to require that exchanges occur always at the seller's price or always at the buyer's price. Consider the application of the buyer's-price and seller's-price policies to the example in Table 3 . Suppose the auction matches the highest buy o er with the lowest sell o er until the exchanges are exhausted. The pay-seller's-price policy would result in transactions agent 1 sells to agent 5 for $5, agent 4 sells to agent 2 for $6.
The pay-buyer's-price policy produces agent 1 sells to agent 5 for $9, agent 4 sells to agent 2 for $8.
We can form a convex combination of the two extremes. Let 2 0; 1]. The price of the transaction between buyer i and seller h is w i + (1 ? )w h .
Note that, unlike the k-auction function, the -price is computed for each pair of agents. This function is used in a study by Hu and Wellman 18].
Chronological Pricing
Chronological pricing uses the bids' submission times to determine the exchange price. Given an exchange pair, earlier-bid pricing uses the price of the bid that was placed earlier, whereas later-bid pricing uses the price of the later bid. The former, designated ET , generalizes the method in which prices are determined in the CDA to permit it to be used regardless of the timing of clears. Later-bid pricing is simply ET 's natural complement.
Consider the application of the earlier-bid pricing to the exchanges determined above. Earliest pricing computes the transactions: agent 1 sells to agent 5 for $5, agent 4 sells to agent 2 for $8.
If, instead, the auction formed the same matches but set the prices according to the later bids, the following transactions would occur: agent 1 sells to agent 5 for $9, agent 4 sells to agent 2 for $6. Table 4 summarizes the di erent transaction prices for seven of the pricing functions described to this point. The simple example problem was constructed to illustrate di erences between these seven, and does not elicit interesting behavior form
Comparisons

1S
, so that function is excluded from the comparison.
As mentioned, the surplus that an agent captures depends on how the transaction pairs are determined. Table 5 shows, for the four discriminatory pricing functions, how the price, and therefore agent 4's surplus, depends on who agent 4 trades with.
Matching Functions with Indivisible Bids
Suppose all of the o ers are indivisible. The per-unit price at which agent i expresses willingness to exchange z units is given by w ?1 i (z). Note that a negative value of z expresses a sell o er, and a quantity that i has not where iz = 1 means that i's o er for z units is part of the solution. The rst constraint states that we do not allocate more than we have (and can dispose of any extra supply at no cost). The second constraint ensures that no agent wins at more than one quantity. We designate the matching function that solves this optimization function knapsack .
When there is only one sell o er, and it has an associated reserve price of zero, (2) reduces to a 0-1 knapsack problem 15]. Therefore, (2) is also NP-hard.
A second problem associated with bid indivisibility is that linear pricing may not admit separating price vectors, as discussed in Section 3.3.1. To provide agents with the information necessary to determine their status in the auction, the auction needs to quote a nonlinear price vector.
In practice, online auction services (e.g., UBid
10
) that allow indivisible bids in a single-seller auction implement a greedy approximation algorithm, greedy . Bids are sorted decreasing in price, with ties broken in favor of quantity and submission time. The algorithm traverses the list, accepting o ers until supply is reached, and skipping o ers that cannot be satis ed from the remaining supply. The algorithm is computationally e cient (O(m), where m is the number of bids).
However, the information provided by the auction makes it di cult for participants to determine bidding strategies, for two reasons. First, rather than announce prices, UBid announces all of the current winning bidders, a list which often contains a hundred or more di erent bidders. Second, even though the auction employs an ascending rule, a bid that is not winning now Table 6 : A set of bids that can lead to arbitrarily bad outcomes when p 2 > p 3 and the greedy algorithm is used.
could become a winning bid in the future. Consider a case with two objects for sale. The rst bidder is agent 1, who bids $5 for one unit. Then agent 2 bids $6 each for two units, displacing agent 1. Finally, agent 3 bids $8 for one unit. The algorithm now decrees that agents 3 and 1 are the winners.
In the worst case, this algorithm can lead to arbitrarily bad allocations. Consider the situation in Table 6 . When p 2 > p 3 , the greedy algorithm will select agent 2's o er rst, and we will be unable to satisfy agent 3's o er. If zp 3 > p 2 , the we will miss zp 3 ?p 2 surplus. We can make this arbitrarily bad by raising z or p 3 .
Multidimensional Matching Functions
Recently, much research attention has been focused on the problem of allocating heterogenous, discrete resources. For the purposes of this paper, we consider only those proposed mechanisms that accept bids on bundles of resources, and describe their matching and price quote functions. Most are based in part of computing the optimal surplus in received bids, which reduces to optimal revenue when only buyers bid.
Generalized Vickrey Auction
The well-known Generalized Vickrey Auction (GVA) 19] extends the intuition gained from Vickrey's 38] seminal work, and results by Clarke 6] and Groves 16] in general allocation problems.
The GVA is a direct revelation mechanism, but we include it here because in many cases agent types can be characterized in the form of o er correspondences. Each agent submits a utility function, and the auction computes the optimal allocation and discriminatory payments. An agent pays (receives) its \social impact", which is de ned as the value that the others lose (gain) from the agent's presence. The GVA's incentive compatibility property follows from the fact that an agent's bid determines what it gets, but not how much it pays (or receives).
The RSB Mechanism
The single-seller auction proposed by Rassenti, Smith, and Bul n 30] accepts bids on packages, and computes a locally e cient allocation from those bids. The winning agents pay their bids. Price quotes are generated by solving two linear relaxations of the optimization problem. These price quotes are not guaranteed to be separating.
Adaptive User Selection Mechanism
Banks et al. 2] introduced a single-sided, iterative mechanism, called the Adaptive User Selection Mechanism (AUSM), that does not solve the optimization problem directly. Instead, AUSM posts the current best allocation on a bulletin board visible to all of the participants, and lets the agents gure out how to improve it. To become part of the current best allocation, a new bid has to o er more than the sum of all of the bids it displaces. Bids that are not part of the best allocation are posted in a standby queue designed to facilitate the coordination of two or more smaller bidders combining on a new bid large enough to displace a larger bidder. In AUSM, winning agents pay the value of their bid.
BICAP
The BICAP mechanism 4] introduces binary feasibility constraints to the basic combinatorial allocation problem. Bids must obey a beat-the-quote rule, in addition to dominance. The mechanism produces price quotes on each bid based on optimization of surplus, subject to the speci ed constraints. CPCA 3] modi es BICAP in a manner similar to AUSM, relying on the bidders to themselves calculate improving allocations. Unlike AUSM, in CPCA the bidder identifying an improvement gets a share of the improved surplus, with this fraction increasing with time elapsed.
RAD Mechanism
Recently, Demartini et al. proposed the Resource Allocation Design (RAD) 9], which combines features of AUSM and the Simultaneous Ascending Auction used by the FCC. RAD allows agents to place bids on bundles, then computes the locally e cient allocation. A linear program is solved to generate approximate prices for the individual items, and a beat-the-quote rule is used. Agents need to maintain eligibility by continuing to win items, or by submitting new bids.
iBundle
Another single-sided, ascending combinatorial auction is Parkes's iBundle 29]. iBundle allows bids on bundles and computes the locally e cient allocation. It associates payments with bundles, in e ect, announcing a payment lattice as a price quote. There are three variations of iBundle, which di er based on the manner in which payments are computed: iBundle(2) announces anonymous payments to every agent, iBundle(3) announces discriminatory payments, and iBundle(d) announces discriminatory payments for some agents, and anonymous payments for the rest.
A1BA
We have recently proposed the Ascending k-Bundle Auction 44, 46] (AkBA), a single-sided, iterative auction that accepts bids on bundles and computes a locally e cient allocation. It di ers from AUSM, RAD, and iBundle in that agents are not necessarily charged the value of their bid. Instead, AkBA uses a method for computing uniform payments on bundles that ensures that the nal allocation satis es the conditions of a payment equilibrium. Table 7 : Parameter choices that describe three online auctions.
Conclusion
The auction design space presented in this paper captures the essential similarities and di erences of many auction mechanisms in a more descriptive and useful format than the traditional taxonomic perspective. This parametrization is not exhaustive, but it is much more extensive than any others we have seen. We have found this organization of auction policy characteristics very useful in our development of the Michigan Internet AuctionBot. In particular, the deconstruction of auctions into functional components with Table 8 : Parameter choices that describe three classic auctions.
parametrized behaviors coincides nicely with the object-oriented programming approach.
In addition, the parametrization serves as an organizational framework in which to classify research in auction analysis, and uncovers many new, potentially useful, mechanisms. We have seen instances in our own work in which an agent behavior that was assumed as part of a protocol was later found enforceable by a non-obvious combination of rules.
Finally, the parametrization facilitates the communication of auction rules to software agents|a critical step in the development of electronic commerce agents. The AuctionBot agent programming interface includes a method for software agents to request the rules of the auction. Thus, through this single interface, agents can participate in the full range of auction types supported by the server. 
